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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a decree of divorce entered in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, on 
October 26, 1989. The Notice of Appeal was filed on November 24, 
1989. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Although Mr. Homer seeks to complicate this appeal by 
listing multiple issues, there are really only three: 
1. Whether the court abused its discretion in awarding 
permanent alimony to Mrs. Homer. 
2. Whether the court abused its discretion in calculating 
Mr. Homer's child support obligation. 
3. Whether the court abused its discretion in its division 
of the parties' marital assets and in its award of pension 
benefits to Mrs. Homer. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Determinative authority is included in the addendum to this 
brief and by reference made a part hereof. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mrs. Kathe Homer, the Plaintiff-Respondent in this case, 
filed a complaint on September 11', 1987, against her husband, the 
Defendant-Appellant, seeking a decree of divorce, sole custody of 
the parties1 minor child, alimony, child support, a fair and 
equitable division of the real and personal property, and 
attorney's fees. The case was tried before the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding for one day on July 13, 1989. 
Each side was represented by counsel and presented 
documentary evidence, as well as their own testimonies. In 
addition, Mr. Homer presented testimony of three witnesses, 
including Randy Marchant and Maxine Shick, who testified as to 
social security and pension benefits. 
The court issued its Memorandum Decision on July 31, 1989, 
(R. 23 4) a copy of which is attached to Mr. Homer's primary 
brief. The plaintiff's attorney, Richard Johnson, submitted 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, decree of 
divorce and qualified domestic relations order (hereinafter 
"QDRO") on August 23, 1989. 
Thereafter, Mr. Homer, acting as his own attorney, filed a 
motion for reconsideration (R. 303) and objection to the proposed 
qualified domestic relations order. (R. 314) Contemporaneously 
therewith, Mr. Homer submitted his own supplemental findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce. (R. 381) 
In a subsequent Memorandum Decision, filed on October 25, 
1989, (R. 294) the court considered Mr. Homer's objections. (R. 
268) Where the court granted those objections, it interlineated 
the necessary changes on the documents prepared by Mrs. Homer's 
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counsel, and the decree of divorce was entered on October 26, 
1989. (R. 324) The court denied all other objections and all 
other arguments for reconsideration. Mr. Homer filed his notice 
of appeal on November 24, 1989. (R. 324) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff-Respondent, Mrs. Kathe Homer, and the 
Defendant-Appellant, Mr. Stephen Homer, were married on August 
13, 1980. (R. 1) One child was born as issue of this marriage, 
Melissa Ann Homer, on July 17, 1981. (R. 2) At the time of 
trial, she was eight years old. In addition, Mrs. Homer had two 
children from a previous marriage, Ben and Peter, who at time of 
trial were 21 and 19 respectively. (Tr. 39-40). 
At time of trial Mrs. Homer was employed as a library 
technician by the City of Orem, and had gross earnings of 
$1,673.00 per month. (R. 291). Mr. Homer is a licensed attorney 
practicing law in the State of Utah. At time of trial he was 
employed by the City of West Jordan, and his gross income was 
$3,627.00 per month. (R. 291). 
The parties reached a stipulation on the division of all 
personal property except for the value of the parties' two 
automobiles and the division of Mr. Homer's pension benefits. At 
trial, the court found that the value of the marital assets 
awarded to each party was close enough that no offset for the 
values of the vehicles in each party's possession was required as 
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part of the overall equitable property settlement. (R. 285) As 
to pension benefits, the court ordered that each party was 
entitled to one-half of all retirement programs accrued during 
the course of the marriage. (R. 288) The court rejected the 
defendant's argument that a portion of his pension benefits were 
exempt from division because they are a substitute for social 
security benefits and social security would be exempt by federal 
law in this case as the marriage was less than 10 years. (R. 
288) 
The court awarded Mrs. Homer sole custody of the parties' 
minor child, and ordered Mr. Homer to pay child support in the 
amount of $404.95 per month. (R. 287) The court attached a copy 
of the Child Support Obligation Worksheet to the Decree of 
Divorce. (R. 290) The court further found that Mrs. Homer pays 
ongoing child care of $140.00 per month and that the defendant 
was obligated pursuant to prior court order to pay $200.00 per 
month as child support to the children of his prior marriage. 
(R. 287) All such amounts were considered in the worksheet 
calculations (R. 290-293) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Mr. Homer's appellate brief does not comply with the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The facts are not cited to 
the record, and the arguments are not supported by law. In fact, 
many arguments are contrary to well-established case law and 
4 
express statute. In addition, Mr, Homer's brief is burdensome, 
full of irrelevant and immaterial information and an abuse of the 
appellate process. It should be stricken, and Mrs. Homer should 
be awarded her costs and fees for the necessity of defending 
against it. 
2. The lower court's award of permanent alimony in the 
amount of $150.00 per month is consistent with the evidence 
presented at trial and the court's findings. The award should be 
affirmed. 
3. Mr. Homer's child support obligation was correctly 
calculated pursuant to the Uniform Civil Liability for Support 
Act. Mr. Homer was given credit where appropriate for the child 
support ordered to be paid for the children of his prior 
marriage; the consideration of tax consequences is built into the 
child support tables; he presented no evidence at trial that an 
award to him of the dependency exemption would be in the best 
economic interest of the parties; and Mr. Homer has a statutory 
right to reduce his child support payments when work-related 
child support costs are no longer being incurred. Therefore, the 
child support order should be affirmed in all respects. 
4. The lower court's award of personal property, including 
pension benefits, was not an abuse of discretion. Instead, the 
assets were correctly valued at the time of divorce. The trial 
court has discretion to award pension benefits based upon a 
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percentage, and all such benefits acquired by both parties during 
a marriage are subject to division as marital assets. The trial 
court correctly denied Mr. Homer an offset for amounts paid in 
support of his stepchildren during the parties1 marriage. 




MOTION TO STRIKE AND FOR AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS1 FEES 
Mrs. Homer respectfully moves this Court to strike Mr. 
Homer's Appellate Brief and to award her costs and attorneyfs 
fees expended in the necessity of defending against that brief 
pursuant to Rules 24 and 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (k), all briefs must be "concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings 
and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous 
matters." The rule goes on to provide that "briefs which are not 
in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees 
against the offending lawyer." 
Pursuant to Rule 33, a party is entitled to an award for its 
damages if the court determines that an appeal is frivolous. 
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These damages may include single or double costs and/or 
reasonable attorneys1 fees to the prevailing party. 
These rules are directly applicable to this case. Mr. 
Homer's brief does not comply with the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure in the following respects: 
1. Contrary to Rule 24(e), Mr. Homer has completely failed 
to make any citation to the record in his brief. Therefore, his 
statement of facts is unsupported. Although Mr. Homer cites case 
law, he rarely uses it to support his position. Instead, Mr. 
Homer uses the brief as a forum to attempt to relitigate factual 
issues based upon his interpretation of equity. Many of these 
positions are contrary to well established case law and statute. 
Therefore, his positions are "not grounded in fact, not warranted 
by existing law, and not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law" as required by Rule 
33(b) . 
In only one example among many, Mr. Homer argues that it is 
somehow unconstitutional to award permanent alimony in a 
contested, no-fault divorce over his objection. There is simply 
no basis in law for this position, and the fact that Mr. Homer is 
an attorney makes this abuse of the appellate process even more 
egregious. 
2. Looking strictly to the form of the brief, it is a 
burdensome and irrelevant stream-of-consciousness rendition of 
Mr. Homer's self-serving view of fairness. Further, Mr. Homer 
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makes scandalous allegations, among others, that Mrs. Homer was 
never committed to the marriage and that she intentionally 
delayed this matter so as to increase the benefits to which she 
would be entitled upon divorce. Such allegations are without 
merit or basis. Mr. Homer goes so far as to mock the judicial 
system by implying that a judge's personal experience in his or 
her marriage is the primary influence on a judge in his or her 
decision to award alimony. Again, Mr. Homer's position as an 
officer of the court makes the allegations particularly 
offensive. 
Based on the foregoing, Mrs. Homer moves this Court to 
strike Mr. Homer's brief and to award her judgment for her costs 
and attorney's fees incurred by the necessity of defending 
against it. 
II 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING ALIMONY TO MRS. HOMER 
Mr. Homer argues that the lower court failed to make 
adequate findings to support its award of alimony and that the 
award of permanent alimony was an abuse of discretion. In 
addition, Mr. Homer submits a lengthy monologue arguing that the 
award of alimony is unconstitutional in two respects. 
First, he argues that the court cannot award alimony in a 
no-fault divorce over the objection of the paying spouse. 
Second, he argues that historically only women have received 
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alimony, and therefore the award is discriminatory. 
Although he makes these assertions, Mr. Homer cites no legal 
authority for his arguments and both are unsupported by law and 
in fact. Instead, the concept of fault in a divorce is 
irrelevant to an award of alimony. This principle was outlined 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 
1979) . In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that fault should 
not be used in setting alimony or dividing property to impose a 
punishment upon either party. The standard was articulated in 
the case of Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978) wherein 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that: 
The purpose of alimony is to provide 
post-marital support; it is intended neither 
as a penalty imposed on the husband nor as a 
reward granted to the wife. Its function is 
to provide support for the wife as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent 
her from becoming a public charge. Important 
criteria in determining a reasonable award 
for support and maintenance are the financial 
conditions and needs of the wife, considering 
her station in life; her ability to produce 
sufficient income for herself; and the 
ability of the husband to provide support. 
Id. at 147. (quoting English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 
1977)). 
Therefore, the grounds for each divorce, regardless of their 
severity, are irrelevant to the court's determination of alimony. 
Mr. Homer's argument that it is unconstitutional to award alimony 
in a no-fault divorce is unsupportable. 
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The second aspect of Mr. Homer's unconstitutionality 
argument, that an award of alimony is discriminatory, is likewise 
absurd. Mr. Homer cites no facts or legal authority for his 
claim. Instead, more women than men have been awarded alimony 
for the simple fact that women have not historically been 
financially self-supporting. Therefore, the case law reflects 
the reality of women's roles in the work force. 
Turning to the issues which are relevant to an award of 
alimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this 
case. The Utah courts have established three factors which must 
be considered by the trial court in making an alimony award, and 
such an award will not be overturned on appeal absent a manifest 
abuse of discretion. As recently outlined by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Qsguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 131 Utah Adv. Rptr. 21 
(March 19, 1990) : 
Trial courts have broad discretion in 
awarding alimony. We will not disturb the 
trial court's alimony award so long as the 
trial court exercises its discretion within 
the standards set by the court. In 
determining alimony, the trial court must 
consider three factors: 1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; 
2) the ability of the receiving spouse to 
produce a sufficient income for him or 
herself; and 3) the ability of the responding 
spouse to provide support. If the trial 
court considers these factors, this court 
will not disturb the alimony award unless 
such a serious inequity has resulted as to 
manifest clear abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 22. (citing Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988) and 
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Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989)). 
Applying these factors to the case on appeal, it is clear 
that the court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a 
support award for Mrs. Homer. To begin with, the court found 
that Mrs. Homer was employed as a library technician by the City 
of Orem, with a gross monthly income of $1,673.00. (R. 291) The 
court also found that Mr. Homer is a licensed attorney practicing 
law in the state of Utah and that his gross monthly income was 
$3,627.00. (R. 291) Evidence before the court established that 
Mrs. Homer's expenses totalled $1,706.56. (R. 114) These facts 
are set forth in the findings of fact as follows: 
14. . . . The court finds that the 
defendant has a monthly income of $3,627 and 
that the plaintiff has an income of $1,673. . 
16. The court finds that the plaintiff 
is in need of alimony and the defendant has 
the ability to pay the same and, accordingly, 
the defendant is ordered to pay to the 
plaintiff the sum of $150.00 per month as 
alimony payable in two equal monthly payments 
on the 5th and 20th of each month commencing 
July 19, 1989. 
Mr. Homer argues that these are insufficient findings of 
fact to support the trial court's award of alimony. Contrary to 
this assertion, the findings are adequate in light of the fact 
that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to make a 
proper determination of alimony, including expenses and earnings 
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of both parties. Therefore, any lack of additional findings is 
not fatal on appeal. As this court stated in Boyle v. Boyle, 735 
P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1989): 
This Court concurs in the Supreme Court's 
reflection that more detailed findings on 
each required factor would assist in the 
appellate process. However, we find as did 
the Supreme Court in Paffel, that 'the 
evidence in this case supports the lower 
court's order and appellant has made no 
showing to rebut the presumption that the 
trial court did consider respondent's income, 
expenses and need for support.' 
Id. at 671-72. (quoting Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 102 (Utah 
1986)). 
Finally, Mr. Homer argues that it was an abuse of discretion 
to award Mrs. Homer permanent alimony. Both the Utah Supreme 
Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have held that permanent 
alimony should be awarded after a long-term marriage. (See Jones 
v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 
(Utah 1985); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) and 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988)). 
Although the courts have not defined what constitutes a 
long-term marriage, the Utah Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis, 749 
P.2d 647 (Utah 1988) upheld an award of permanent alimony in the 
sum of $750.00 per month after a 13-year marriage. In the Davis 
case, the Court pointed out that the trial judge had considered 
the three factors necessary. The Court stated: 
All three factors must be considered, and the 
ultimate test of the propriety of an alimony 
12 
award is whether, given all of these factors, 
the party receiving alimony will be able to 
support him-or herself 'as nearly as possible 
at the standard of living . . . enjoyed 
during the marriage.1 
Id. at 649. (quoting Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075, and English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)). The Utah Supreme Court 
went on to compare each parties' income after the payment of 
alimony to determine that Mr. Davis "can afford the alimony 
awarded and is left with ample resources to provide himself with 
what is very likely to be a far more luxurious living standard 
than [his wife] will enjoy." Davis, 749 P.2d at 649. 
These principles are directly applicable to Mr. Homer's 
appeal. The trial court only awarded Mrs. Homer the minimal sum 
of $150.00 per month in alimony. Coupled with the child support 
of $404.95, Mrs. Homer's total income with the award of alimony 
is still significantly less than Mr. Homer's income. Mr. Homer 
is left with ample resources to provide for himself, and the 
court's award to Mrs. Homer of $150.00 per month was not an abuse 
of discretion. It should be upheld on appeal. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN CALCULATING MR. HOMER'S CHILD SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION 
In his appeal of his child support obligation, Mr. Homer 
alleges three errors. 
The first error is defined by Mr. Homer as a failure of the 
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trial court to consider the income tax consequences of the order. 
Mrs. Homer asserts that what Mr. Homer really means is that the 
court erred in not awarding him the dependency exemption. 
Second, Mr. Homer argues that it was an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court not to consider amounts he voluntarily pays 
toward support of children from his previous marriage in excess 
of the court ordered child support in that marriage. 
Finally, Mr. Homer argues that it was error to enter a child 
support obligation in an amount that includes child care costs 
when those costs will not be paid at some point in the future. 
The Utah Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act governs 
child support awards in the state of Utah. The appropriate child 
support worksheet was completed in this matter, and it has been 
incorporated in the lower court's findings and conclusions. This 
worksheet includes the appropriate base combined child support 
obligation calculated upon the parties' gross incomes. The child 
support tables in Utah Code Ann., § 78-45-7.14 (Supp. 1990) are 
adjusted for FICA, federal and state taxes. Therefore, contrary 
to Mr. Homer's initial assertion that the court did not consider 
the income tax consequences of the award, such consideration is 
built into the process and the statute. 
The other aspect of this issue is Mr. Homer's claim he 
should have received the dependency exemption for the minor 
child. While state courts do have the authority to order a 
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custodial parent to execute a section 152 declaration to allow a 
non-custodial parent to claim a dependent as a tax exemption, 
courts can do so only in narrow circumstances. This was outlined 
by the Utah Court of Appeals in Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232 
(Utah App. 1989). The court pointed out that a specific finding 
must be made that the award of the exemption financially benefits 
the parties. The Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
Thus, use of the power to order a custodial 
parent to execute a section 152 declaration 
should not be used to evenly or otherwise 
divide the available exemptions without 
regard to the particular economic realities. 
On the contrary, it should be limited to 
those situations where the non-custodial 
parent had the higher income and provides the 
majority of support for the child or children 
whose exemption is claimed — support at a 
level which can be increased as a result of a 
reduction in his or her tax burdens. Indeed, 
it would be an abuse of discretion for a 
divorce court to order a custodial parent to 
sign the declaration in the absence of 
appropriately supported findings to that 
effect or demonstrating other exceptional 
circumstances making it in the best interest 
of the parties and their children that the 
declarations be signed. 
Id. at 239. Applying this principle to the facts of this case, 
Mr. Homer offered absolutely no evidence at trial that an award 
of the exemption to him would economically benefit the parties or 
that it would be in the best interest of the parties and their 
minor child. Not only is this contrary to the law as outlined in 
Motes, a party cannot raise for the first time on appeal an issue 
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not raised before the trial court. (See Paffel v. Paffel, 732 
P.2d 96, 99 (Utah 1986)). Therefore, this aspect of Mr. Homerfs 
argument is without merit. 
Mr. Homer's next contention is that the trial court erred in 
failing to give him credit for amounts he has paid toward support 
of the children of his first marriage in excess of what h. was 
ordered to pay. This contention is directly contrary to express 
statutory law. Utah Code Ann., § 78-45-7.6 (Supp. 1990) states 
as follows: 
As used in the guidelines, 'adjusted gross 
income' is the amount calculated by 
substracting from gross income alimony 
previously ordered and paid and child support 
previously ordered. 
At trial, Mr* Homer argued that, in addition to the $200.00 he 
was ordered to pay, he was voluntarily paying his first wife an 
additional $100.00 a month toward support of his children. To 
begin with, the lower court found, in Finding of Fact No. 14, 
"that the defendant is presently ordered to pay $200 per month 
support to the children of a prior marriage." When Mr. Homer 
objected to this finding on the basis that he paid amounts in 
excess of amounts ordered, the trial court addressed that issue 
in its Memorandum Decision dated October 26, 1989, and stated: 
The court will not change the proposed order 
with regards to child care expenses, nor will 
non-ordered amounts of support paid to other 
children be considered on the child support 
obligation worksheet. 
(R. 269). The court's resolution of the issue is consistent with 
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the statute, and Mr. Homer's argument again has no basis in law. 
Finally, Mr. Homer argues that the child support award as 
entered fails to take into consideration the fact that 
work-related child care costs will not continue to be incurred by 
Mrs. Homer once the minor child reaches a certain age. Once 
again, this argument is expressly contrary to the statute. Utah 
Code Ann., § 78-45-7.16 (Supp. 1990) directly resolves Mr. 
Homer's concern. That statute states: 
1. The monthly amount to be paid for 
reasonable work-related child care costs 
actually incurred on behalf of the dependent 
children of the parents shall be specified as 
a separate monthly amount in the order. 
2. If an actual expense included in an 
amount specified in the order ceases to be 
incurred, the obligor may suspend making 
monthly payment of that expense while it is 
not being incurred, without obtaining a 
modification of the child support order. 
Thus, Mr. Homer has nothing about which to complain. The 
worksheet which is attached to the findings and conclusions 
outlines his base child support obligation and his child support 
obligation to be paid while work-related child care costs are 
actually incurred. Pursuant to the terms of the statute, when 
those costs are no longer incurred, Mr. Homer will have no 
obligation to pay the higher amount and must only pay the base 
award. Mr. Homer is an attorney and to have even raised this 
issue on appeal without doing basic research into the law is an 
abuse of the appellate process. 
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All of Mr. Homer's arguments on appeal of his child support 
obligation have no basis in fact or law. Instead, the lower 
court carefully considered the evidence before it and complied 
with the law as outlined in the Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Act. Therefore, Mr. Homer's support obligation should be 
affirmed in all respects. 
IV 
THE COURT'S DIVISION OF THE PERSONAL 
PROPERTY, INCLUDING PENSION BENEFITS, WAS 
FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
Prior to trial in this matter the parties had stipulated to 
the division of all personal property except whether or not Mr. 
Homer was entitled to an offset for the disparity in value of the 
vehicles possessed by each party and the division of pension 
benefits. At trial, Mr. Homer argued that some of his pension 
benefits were exempt from division and that others should be 
valued as of the date of separation and not as of the date of 
trial. Finally, he argues that any award of benefits to Mrs. 
Homer should be offset by the amount of his support of her 
children during their marriage. 
The court found that, despite the disparity between the 
value of the parties' vehicles, the overall property distribution 
was fair and equitable. The court also divided equally all 
pension and retirement benefits accrued during the course of the 
marriage. The court made the following finding: 
9. The Court finds that the parties did 
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reserve for trial the issue concerning values 
of the cars that each received. The 
Defendant claimed to be entitled to an offset 
because his car had a lower value. The Court 
finds that the values of the cars are close 
enough that no offset is required as part of 
an overall equitable property settlement in 
this case and confirms the award of the 
automobiles as they existed at the time of 
trial. 
The only evidence before the trial court on the personal 
property issue was Mrs. Homer's testimony and the Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 10. (A copy of Exhibit 10 is included in the Addendum to 
this brief as Exhibit B and by reference made a part hereof.) 
Exhibit 10 sets forth the agreed upon division of the personal 
property and the values of each. Under that division, Mrs. Homer 
was awarded personal property in the amount of $4,550.00, and Mr. 
Homer was awarded personal property in the amount of $3,940.00—a 
difference of approximately $600.00. Mrs. Homer's evidence at 
trial remained uncontroverted, and Mr. Homer put in no evidence 
which would establish a different value for the cars or other 
personal property. 
Based upon the evidence, the overall division of property is 
equitable. Any issue of the values of the automobiles cannot be 
considered in a vacuum without consideration of the entire 
property distribution. 
Mr. Homer also raised this issue in his objections to the 
findings of fact. The court responded in its Memorandum Decision 
dated October 26, 1989, by stating that: 
Defendant's objection to proposed finding # 6 
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is an attempt to relitigate on the issues of 
the respective of values of the cars awarded 
to the parties. The Court will not change 
it's [sic] determination regarding the cars 
as it is a part of an overall equitable 
property settlement. 
(R. 269). Mr. Homer's appellate brief is yet another attempt to 
relitigate the issues before the court on the division of 
property. The trial court, based on all the evidence before it, 
made a fair and equitable division of the parties' personal 
property which should be upheld on appeal. 
Mr. Homer's second contention is that the trial court erred 
in awarding Mrs. Homer one-half of the amounts accrued in all of 
his pension and retirement accounts during the course of the 
marriage. Mr. Homer claims this error is three-fold: 
1. That the accounts should be valued as of the date of 
separation and not the date of divorce; 
2. That the court's failure to make a specific finding as 
to a dollar value of each account is reversible error; and 
3. That his pension benefits are a substitute for Social 
Security and, since under federal law Social Security benefits 
would be exempt in this case, these benefits should also be 
exempt. 
Contrary to Mr. Homer's assertions, the trial court's 
division of pension and retirement accounts was appropriate and 
strictly according to law. 
At trial, each party presented evidence as to their 
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retirement benefits accrued over the course of the marriage. The 
court addressed the division of these benefits in Findings of 
Fact Nos. 18 and 19 which state: 
18. The Court finds, as it relates to 
retirement, that the Court will order that a 
qualified domestic relations order be 
prepared and submitted to the employers of 
each of the parties. Each of the parties is 
entitled to one-half of the retirement 
programs of the other accrued during the 
course of the marriage. This includes the 
Defendant's pension account which he claims 
is a substitute for social security. The 
Court is now [sic] aware of any authority 
which exempts this type of pension from being 
divided as a marital asset. The only reason 
social security is not divided is that 
federal law expressly prohibits division. 
This decision also includes division of the 
retirement account which Defendant claims 
belongs to West Jordan City. 
19. Each of the parties is entitled to 
one-half of the individual retirement account 
and that distribution is ordered to be 
effective immediately with both parties being 
allowed to roll over the retirement account 
into an account chosen by them. 
In his objections to these findings, Mr. Homer argued that 
the retirement account should be divided as of the date of 
separation and that his pension was exempt from division. (R. 
250-251) In response, in its Memorandum Decision dated October 
26, 1989, the trial court stated: 
Defendant's objection to proposed Finding # 
18 is not well taken. Had the Defendant 
wished to limit the Plaintiff's interest in 
payments made to retirement programs during 
the pendency of this litigation, he could 
have moved for a bifurcated proceeding, and 
could likely have ended the marriage shortly 
after the action was filed. Plaintiff is 
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entitled to a percentage of whatever 
retirement benefits were accrued during the 
time of entry into the marriage, and final 
termination of the marriage through this 
divorce action. 
(R. 269) 
Findings of Fact Nos, 18 and 19 are sufficient to support 
the court's division of pension and retirement benefits and the 
subsequent entry of the QDRO. In turn, these findings are well 
supported by case law. To begin with, it is well established 
that assets of a marriage are valued as of the date of the 
divorce. (See Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249 (Utah App. 1989). 
This rule also applies to division of pension and retirement 
benefits. 
Second, there is no requirement in law that a trial court 
make a specific finding as to a dollar value of a retirement 
account or pension benefit. To the contrary, in the case of 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court approved the award of a percentage of retirement benefits. 
Third, Mr. Homer cites no law for his proposition that his 
retirement benefits are exempt from division. Instead, he seeks 
to expand the exemption provided by federal law for Social 
Security benefits to his pension account• Not only Ls there no 
support for such a position, it is indeed contrary to law. 
Instead, as outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in Woodward, 
supra., a trial court has broad power to consider all assets of a 
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marriage, including pension benefits• The Court stated: 
In Enqlert v. Englert, Utah, 576 P.2d 1274 
(1978), we emphasized the equitable nature of 
proceedings dealing with the family, pointing 
out that the court may take into 
consideration all of the pertinent 
circumstances. These circumstances encompass 
'all of the assets of every nature possessed 
by the parties, whenever obtained and from 
whatever source derived; and that this 
includes any such pension fund or insurance.1 
To the extent that Bennett v. Bennett, supra, 
may limit the ability of the court to 
consider all of the parties' assets and 
circumstances, including retirement and 
pension rights, it is expressly overruled. 
Id. at 432. (quoting Englert, 576 P.2d at 1276). 
Finally, Mr. Homer's argument that Mrs. Homer's award of 
pension and retirement benefits should be reduced or offset by 
the amounts he contributed for the support of her two children, 
his stepchildren, is without merit. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.1 
imposes a duty on parents to support their stepchildren during 
the term of the marriage. To expect to be reimbursed or credited 
for such amounts if or when the marriage terminates is ludicrous 
and would, in its practical effect, completely negate the 
statutory duty imposed by § 78-45-4.1. Such a result is contrary 
to public policy and unsupported by law. 
Therefore, all of Mr. Homer's arguments with respect to the 
division of the parties' retirement benefits are wholly 
unsupported by and contrary to current law. His appeal of the 
issue should be denied, and the trial court's ruling should be 
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affirmed in all respects. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Homer's appellate brief fails to comply with the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the issues contained therein 
have no basis in fact or law. The form and substance of Mr. 
Homer's brief are so inadequate that this Court should grant Mrs. 
Homer's motion to strike and award her costs and fees incurred by 
the necessity of defending against it. 
The lower court's award of permanent alimony and child 
support are supported by the evidence and the findings. The 
division of personal property, including pension benefits, is 
fair and equitable and according to law. The lower court's 
decision should be affirmed in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of September, 1990. 
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Attorneys for 
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1. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989). 
Disposition of property — Maintenance and Health care 
of parties and 
jurisdiction -
of alimony^ __ 
children 
- Custody 
— Court to have 
and visitation — 




(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
property, and parties. 
. . . 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining 
child support, an order assigning financial responsibility 
for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on 
behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial parent. If the 
court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and 
that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, 
it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to 
provide the day care for the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.1 (1987). 
Duty of a stepparent to support stepchild — Effect of 
termination of marriage or common law relationship. 
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same 
extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required to 
support a child. Provided, however, that upon the 
termination of the marriage or common law relationship 
between the stepparent and the child's natural or adoptive 
parent the support obligation shall terminate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6 (Supp. 1990). 
Adjusted gross income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income" 
is the amount calculated by subtracting from gross income 
alimony previously ordered and paid and child support 
previously ordered. 
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child 
support award by adjusting the gross incomes of the parents 
for alimony ordered in the pending proceeding. In 
establishing alimony, the court shall consider that in 
determining the child support, the guidelines do not provide 
a deduction from gross income for alimony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.16 (Supp. 1990). 
Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred. 
(1) The monthly amount to be paid for reasonable 
work-related child care costs actually incurred on behalf of 
the dependent children of the parents shall be specified as 
a separate monthly amount in the order. 
(2) If an actual expense included in an amount 
specified in the order ceases to be incurred, the obligor 
may suspend making monthly payment of that 
2 
expense while it is not being incurred, without 
obtaining a modification of the child support order• 
PERSONAL PROPERTY LIST 
ITEM FMV 
1981 Datsun 210 
1983 Honda Accord 
Waterbed 
Color t.v. 
Radial arm saw 
Wing back chairs 
Word processor 
Refrigerator 
Washing machine 
13" t.v. 
VCR 
Waterbed 
Shop tools 
Dishwasher (replaced) 
VCR 
Disc player 
Freezer 
Picnic table 
$1,200 
4,000 
50 
75 
100 
75 
700 
600 
40 
150 
250 
300 
500 
150 
100 
100 
75 
25 
Plaintiff $4,550.00 
Defendant 3,940.00 
EXHIBIT B 
AWARDED TO 
Defendant 
Plaintiff 
Plaintiff 
Plaintiff 
Defendant 
Plaintiff 
Defendant 
Defendant 
Defendant 
Defendant 
Defendant 
Defendant 
Defendant 
Plaintiff 
Plaintiff 
Plaintiff 
Defendant 
Defendant 
